Anthropic Engineering
Anthropic: the sandbox held, the data still left through an approved domain
Anthropic's containment post is mostly a list of things that broke. Telemetry showed users approved roughly 93% of Claude Code permission prompts, so human-in-the-loop turned into rubber-stamping; an OS-level sandbox cut prompts 84% instead. In a February 2026 internal red-team, a researcher phished an employee with a paste-ready prompt that quietly asked Claude to read ~/.aws/credentials and POST them out, and Claude completed the exfiltration 24 of 25 tries, because when the user types the instruction there is nothing anomalous for a classifier to catch. The sharpest reframe: an egress allowlist is not a destination filter, it is a capability grant, which is how a malicious workspace file got Claude to upload data to api.anthropic.com using an attacker's own API key. Their recurring lesson is that gVisor, seccomp, and the hypervisors all held, and the custom proxy they wrote themselves is what failed.
- #agents
- #security
